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Property and Other Worries
NICK SAGE
ABSTRACT This comment, written for a symposium on Rowan Cruft’s Human Rights,
Ownership, and the Individual, considers some aspects of Cruft’s discussion of property. I
suggest that Cruft glosses over certain complexities in this area, especially concerning the rela-
tion between property and other kinds of right. I question some of Cruft’s arguments about the
justifiability of property and indeed whether he is really interested in property as such.
Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual is an extraordinarily ambitious book. Pro-
fessor Cruft develops a sophisticated abstract framework for thinking about rights,
which he then applies to various areas of legal and ethical life, especially human rights
and property. This approach connects areas that might otherwise seem disparate by
viewing them through the lens of the same philosophical abstractions. At the same
time, it risks overlooking significant detail. Here I will consider aspects of Cruft’s dis-
cussion of property, suggesting he glosses over complexities in this area, especially
concerning the relation between property and other kinds of right. I will question
Cruft’s arguments about the justifiability of property and indeed whether he is really
interested in property. But none of what I say will call into question the philosophical
value of his discussion.
Cruft On Property
Why does Cruft discuss property? In part because it seems to him very difficult to jus-
tify. Property rights do not obviously advance the good of anyone other than the
owner.1 In fact,
As his use of the first person suggests, Cruft is worried here not just about the prop-
erty portfolios of the extremely rich – though he does express concern that Bill Gates
might have ‘$2 billion kept in one of his bank accounts’.3 Cruft is also worried about
his ownership of a garden shed in Stirling in which he and his family keep their bicy-
cles.4
In expressing this concern about the connection between property and poverty or
other disadvantage, Cruft joins a philosophical tradition dating back at least to the
Franciscan debates at the beginning of medieval rights discourse.5 He also joins more
modern traditions of capitalist critique. Cruft wants to reevaluate ‘the systems of tres-
passory duties and economic liberties broadly constitutive of modern free markets: sys-
tems that give individual people and corporate entities property over much more’ than
may be justifiable.6 At the same time, Cruft observes that these systems are not wholly
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to blame for the injustices he identifies, and they may also bring many benefits – a
point to which we shall return.
Given this motivation for discussing property, what does Cruft think property is? He
focuses on the institution’s ‘conceptual core’.7 At the very heart of property, Cruft
believes, are the owner’s Hohfeldian ‘rights of exclusion over X’, correlating with the
duties others owe, roughly speaking, ‘to keep off X’.8 Slightly less central, though still
part of the core, are the owner’s Hohfeldian privileges ‘to use X’, correlating with
others’ lack of any right to prevent the use.9 While Cruft does not explicitly define the
variable ‘X’, his initial discussion suggests he is thinking, at least paradigmatically, of
physical things (or spaces): his examples include a coat, an artwork, an apartment, a
garden, and a meadow.
Subsequently, Cruft refines his definition of property, after reflecting upon money –
including money holdings in bank accounts – which he takes to be a kind of property.
Cruft’s reflection on money first of all ‘reveals the Hohfeldian power to be almost as
central to modern property’ as rights of exclusion and privileges of use.10 Because,
‘constitutive of money’, Cruft believes, is a Hohfeldian ‘power to create rights . . . over
something over which someone else currently has rights (normally conditional on con-
sent from that party)’.11 Hence Cruft can use £10 to buy a haircut, a lecture, or a
chicken from you, if you consent.12 Cruft’s reflection on money also confirms he is
inclined to think of the subject matter of a property right (‘X’) as a ‘thing’ or ‘object’13
– though the thing may be ‘non-physical’, ‘non-material’, or ‘non-concrete’.14 (It must
also be ‘possessable’ and ‘detachable’ from its possessor.)15 Thus, for Cruft, ‘property’
includes money not only in the form of a physical coin or note but also a bitcoin, an
IOU, or a sum in a bank account.16
Having outlined his understanding of property rights, Cruft turns to their justifica-
tion. In particular, he asks whether they might be natural rights. Now, Cruft’s account
of natural rights is technically daunting, but very roughly, he thinks a right can be nat-
ural only if the right-holder’s interests in the existence of the correlative duty regularly
outweigh the countervailing interests of those the duty burdens.17 Thus, to determine
whether a natural right exists, we must undertake a certain calculus of interests.
Applying this view, Cruft concludes most property rights cannot be natural. At least
above some very minimal level of property holdings, the countervailing interests of
persons who are excluded from the property will regularly outweigh the interests of
the owner.18 Clearly, on this view, Bill Gates can have no natural property rights to all
of his enormous wealth.19 Almost as clearly, a Scottish academic has no natural prop-
erty right over his bicycle shed.20
Cruft’s conclusion that his calculus of interests dooms most natural property rights
is ‘bolstered by a related thought about taxation’.21 Taxation of property, it would
seem, is regularly justifiable. According to Cruft, that is because the property owner’s
interests are regularly outweighed by the countervailing interests of others who benefit
from the tax. This seems to confirm that a property owner does not have any regularly
countervailing interest of the kind needed to ground a natural property right. Here
Cruft inverts a familiar libertarian argument: rather than beginning with a claim about
natural property rights and proceeding to argue taxation is unjustified, he begins with
the justifiability of taxation and argues there cannot be much in the way of natural
property.
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Property and the Person
Cruft’s arguments against property rights as natural rights should seem plausible to
many. But has he has proved too much? For his arguments also seem to strike at other
important rights, which are usually thought of not as ‘property’ but as aspects of the
entitlement to one’s person.
Consider your body, and your physical and intellectual efforts, movement, time,
and skill. Consider also your reputation and your privacy. One can conceive of these
items as protected by Hohfeldian rights of exclusion. They may also be associated with
privileges of use, and powers of exchange. At least some of them may be thought of as
‘things’, physical or nonphysical. (A requirement that the thing be detachable from its
possessor would arguably not exclude much beyond the major bodily organs.) There-
fore, at least some of these items would seem to be ‘property’, on Cruft’s account.
Whether or not these rights over one’s body and incorporeal personality are, strictly
speaking, ‘property’ for Cruft, to determine whether they are natural rights we will pre-
sumably have to apply his calculus of interests. And it seems doubtful the calculus will
recommend extensive personality rights of the kind we currently enjoy. At least above
some relatively minimal level of personality holdings, the countervailing interests of
other persons who are excluded will regularly outweigh the relevant interests of the
holder. Were the brain, technical nous, or dogged efforts of Bill Gates and Rowan
Cruft at the disposal of others with very little, those others might no longer be impov-
erished; abolish the exclusionary duties protecting Gates’ and Cruft’s persons and
those others might be liberated, able to feed and educate themselves.
Is it problematic that Cruft’s calculus of interests would seem to recommend far
more minimal personality (including body) rights than we currently enjoy? This
depends on whether one takes the conventional view that at least some aspects of our
personality are sacrosanct, and so not available for disposal to others in the same way
as our property. Alternatively, on a more radical philosophical view, even some of our
body parts, for example, may be confiscated for others’ benefit.22 My point is merely
that the logic of Cruft’s account seems to require him to address these issues.
Indeed, reflection on the implications of Crufts’s account for personality rights
might also lead us to question his avowed focus on property. That focus might now
come to seem somewhat arbitrary, given Cruft’s stated motivations. We saw Cruft
worry that property is particularly difficult to justify because exclusionary rights over
things may create poverty and other disadvantages. However, that worry should surely
also lead us to reevaluate our claims over our bodies and associated physical and intel-
lectual freedoms. These likewise perpetuate economic disadvantage – certainly, they
play a large role in ensuring the relative prosperity of people like Cruft and Bill Gates.
Finally, it is worth noting that Cruft’s ‘bolstering’ argument from taxation is also
susceptible to a challenge based on its implications for personality rights. As David
Owens and Antony Duff have objected, if taxation of property shows that the owner’s
relevant interests are regularly outweighed by others’, and therefore that property
rights are not natural, military conscription seems to show there is no natural right to
one’s body and associated capacities.23 Now, Cruft has various responses here – for
example, he claims conscription is not as regularly justifiable as taxation but appropri-
ate only on extraordinary grounds such as to prevent war. Yet the objection can be
broadened. The right to one’s person is restricted by acts of self-defence, arrest,
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punishment, and so on. It is also arguably restricted by taxation – one might think of,
say, income tax as in part a tax on labour. Similarly, rights to privacy, reputation, and
so forth may be restricted by the public interest in a free press. Thus, someone who is
prima facie attracted to Cruft’s account, but who favours natural personality or body
rights, has their work cut out for them – since they will apparently have to explain
away all of these sorts of limitations.
Property and Contract
Cruft also declines to respect another distinction between different kinds of right that
lawyers, at least, would want to draw: between proprietary and contractual rights.
Consider the $2 billion Cruft worries Bill Gates might keep in his bank account, to
the exclusion of everyone else who might enjoy it. On one popular way of thinking, a
bank-account holder such as Gates has a property right over a sort of nonphysical
object, the money in his account. Cruft, as we have seen, essentially endorses this
view. (Though he also analytically refines it, breaking it down into a bundle of more
specific Hohfeldian jural conceptions: the account holder’s rights to exclude others
from the money, corresponding to their nontrespassory duties, his privileges of use,
and, of course, his powers of exchange.)
Contrast the traditional legal understanding of a bank account. In the eyes of the
law, the account holder’s rights are at least in the first instance not proprietary but
contractual.24 When you deposit, say, some coins at your bank, you retain no property
right over those physical objects – they become the bank’s, and it is entitled to deal
with them as it likes. Having given up your relevant property rights, you are left with a
contract with the bank. This contract contains various enforceable promissory obliga-
tions on the bank’s part and yours, including its obligation to repay you (upon the pre-
sentation of an appropriate demand) an equivalent sum to that which you have
deposited (plus interest, etc.), or to pay the same amount to a third party you have
nominated, and so forth. On this view, then, your bank balance does not list a sort of
store of things (material or immaterial) over which you have proprietary rights to
exclude others, correlative to their nontrespassory duties not to interfere. Rather, the
account balance records one aspect of a complex contractual relationship comprising
various interdependent promises between you and the bank.
While in the popular imagination Bill Gates might keep £2 billion in a bank
account, in reality that would, of course, be far too risky and unprofitable. Gates may
well keep little if any money in any bank account – that is, maintain a credit balance
with a given bank. Since Gates is eminently creditworthy, he could no doubt cover his
day-to-day expenses by taking out low-interest debt, using an overdraft or credit card
or equivalent. In legal contemplation, this would involve a contract obliging Gates to
pay money to the bank or credit-card company. On Cruft’s account, by contrast,
Gates’ negative bank balance or credit-card debt would presumably show up as the
bank or card company’s ‘property’ (that is, its rights of exclusion over an immaterial
thing, the money owed by Gates, correlating with others’ nontrespassory duties not to
interfere with that money, etc).25 To cover other short- and medium-term expenses
Gates might invest in relatively liquid assets such as bonds (or funds that invest in
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them), and those holdings would, of course, involve, inter alia, another elaborate set of
contractual obligations.
Why does it matter whether we think of certain forms of wealth, not as ‘property’ in
the Cruftian sense – on the model of an owner of an object entitled to exclude others
– but as a matter of contract? For one thing, because it becomes unclear how Cruft’s
calculus of interests should even be applied. The structure of the required analysis
starts to look quite different. On the property model, the calculus of interests is rela-
tively straightforward. It directs us to consider, on one side of the ledger, the owner of
an object, and on the other side, everybody else in the world who is excluded from
that object. So, for example, we can assess the interests Bill Gates has in exclusively
enjoying one of his jets and weigh this against the interests of everyone else who is
excluded from the jet. (And it may seem obvious that the interests of everyone else are
overwhelming.) Contrast the contractual case. Here we must consider the interests
implicated by a consensual relationship between two contracting parties, such as the
contractual relationship, comprising a complex set of interdependent promises, essen-
tially amounting to a mutual credit or debit arrangement, between Bill Gates and, say,
JP Morgan Private Bank. This raises a number of questions. Consider the first side of
the ledger: should we here aggregate the interests that Gates and his bank have in
establishing this relationship, or keep their respective interests distinct for the purposes
of the calculus? On the other side of the ledger, whose interests shall we compare to
those of Gates and/or the bank – those of everyone else in the world to whom either
of these parties could be required to loan, or from whom they could be required to
borrow?26 Justifying a bank account, when conceived as a contractual relationship,
arguably starts to look quite different from justifying an individual’s ownership of a
coat, a meadow, or a chicken.
Finally, this line of thought might also lead us to realise that if, like Cruft, we are
concerned about the injustice of relative wealth and poverty, we may need to consider
not just property rights but also the vast set of contractual relationships to which peo-
ple in a modern economy are party.
Property and Taxation
Let us return to Cruft’s ‘bolstering’ argument against natural property rights – which
assumes property taxation is regularly justifiable and takes this to show that there can-
not be much in the way of natural property, since the owner’s interests seem to be reg-
ularly outweighed by the interests of others who benefit from the tax. I now want to
suggest that the force of this argument may be diminished if we consider how little
taxation there actually is on property.
An admittedly very cursory investigation suggests that in Stirling, for example, there
is not much tax on property as such. Certainly, there is not much tax that applies
merely because someone is enjoying a property right to exclude others from an object.
In the case of land, one possible exception is council tax – but even this arguably taxes
the enjoyment of council services rather than property holding as such,27 and in any
event it is minimal relative to the value of expensive properties. (The Stirling Council
website suggests that for residential properties it is capped at just over £4,000 per
year.) There is, of course, tax on transfers of land. (The Scottish Land and Buildings
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Transaction Tax (aka. stamp duty) takes up to 12% of the purchase value, increased
by 3% if the property is a second residence.) As for property other than land, there
seems to be even less tax. There are some taxes that relate to particular forms of
moveable property, but again it seems unlikely these are imposed because the owner is
enjoying a right to exclude. (For example, you can avoid vehicle tax if you do not
drive on public roads, suggesting it is really a road-use tax.) Of course, levies such as
inheritance and income tax may catch transfers of moveable property or the gains from
property.
Arguably, then, the current judgment reflected in the law of Scotland is that there
should be no taxation on the beating heart of Cruftian property – the enjoyment of an
Hohfeldian claim-right to exclude others from an object. (Only taxation on transfers
of property; on profitable activities that may involve property, etc.) Certainly, there is
no extensive taxation of the mere ownership of a garden shed, let alone a family’s bicy-
cles. Now, my point here is not that Scotland’s taxation system is less redistributive
than some might imagine or prefer. My point is that there is arguably no taxation on
property, as such. That, I sugggest, should lead us to question Cruft’s ‘bolstering’ argu-
ment. Cruft seeks to bolster his case against natural property rights by pointing to the
legitimacy of property taxation – but arguably, at least in Cruft’s part of the world,
there is no such thing.
Of course, Scotland’s existing tax system may be a poor guide to what taxation is
actually legitimate.28 A full treatment of this issue would presumably require us to
examine other jurisdictions’ tax systems too, before reaching a more considered judg-
ment about property taxation that reconciles the facts of existing systems (and perhaps
public opinion about them) with philosophical intuition and reasoning. My point here
is only that attention to the stark reality of taxation on the ground in Stirling should
prompt this line of inquiry.
And once again, this line of thought might also suggest that, if our concern is the
justifiability of wealth in a world where many are poor, we should not focus just on
property rights as such, but instead attend more closely to related activities such as
earning income, transacting, or otherwise profiting – activities that may or may not
involve property.
Property and Markets
In the end, Cruft decides that something like our current property system is in fact
justifiable. We do have ‘common good reasons to create and sustain the systems of
trespassory duties and economic liberties broadly constitutive of modern free mar-
kets’.29 Cruft somewhat reluctantly reaches this conclusion because he is persuaded by
classical liberal economists who claim we must recognise extensive property holdings
in order to reap the benefits of free-market capitalism.
Crucially, however, Cruft thinks our property system need not be understood to
confer property rights – i.e., claims that are justified because of the benefit they provide
the right-holder or owner. Instead, we should try to think of our property system as a
scheme of nontrespassory duties that is designed to further the common good of
everyone.30
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In this discussion, Cruft is perhaps surprisingly willing to accede to a particular kind
of liberal view about what ‘constitutes’ the market – a view that emphasises the role of
property. A different kind of liberal might argue that modern free markets are also
constituted by a panoply of other legal and nonlegal rules and institutions. Consider
just a few, legal examples. An important role in constituting markets is surely played
by some of the other kinds of legal right we have already considered: rights to one’s
body and associated capacities such as labour, and, of course, contractual rights. Fur-
thermore, in our market economies there is extensive consumer protection, safety, and
other regulation of virtually all goods and services and their trading. These regulations
define what market actors can produce and the terms on which they must deal with
each other. Competition law maintains the very ‘freedom’ of the market against mono-
poly, cartel, and other forms of abuse. And so on. Once we recognise that our markets
are constituted by a very complex apparatus of many different kinds of rule and insti-
tution, we might become even more reluctant than Cruft to endorse the classical lib-
eral case for property. The benefits of markets can be invoked only to make a case for
the entire complex of rules that constitute them.
Finally, we might again notice that, if we are concerned about relative wealth and
deprivation, we perhaps need to expand our field of view beyond property, to consider
the many other rights, rules, and institutions with important economic effects. Since
the Franciscan debates and continuing through more modern critiques and defences
of free-market capitalism, there has been a tendency to focus on the role of property.
But that may give property more significance – both bad and good – than it really
deserves.
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